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International Organizations and the "Securitisation" of Human and Narcotic Trafficking in Post-Soviet Central Asia[1]

Introduction

Immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991, members of the international community generally continued to perceive the security of the post-Soviet Central Asian region in traditional terms of territorial defence against external aggression. Direct military threats to the Central Asian states were seen as emanating primarily from conflicts in Tajikistan and Afghanistan, with indirect military threats coming from the major neighbouring regional powers, especially Russia and China.

In contrast, by the end of the 1990s, a broad consensus among the international community was developing that the most urgent security issues in the region concern clandestine transnational activities such as illegal migration, narcotic trafficking, arms trafficking, and "terrorism". The collapse of the Soviet Union created an open corridor for uncontrolled transit migration and the post-Soviet Central Asian states lie between the main destination countries for trafficking goods and peoples to East Asia, the Middle East and Europe. Porous borders, poverty, mass unemployment, and lack of resources to manage migration flows have created new sources and markets for various kinds of traffickers.[2] As a result, Central Asia states came to be perceived, to varying extents, as transit (and increasingly destination) countries for narcotic trafficking, and transit, source and destination countries for human trafficking, within and beyond the former Soviet Union.

This paper positions the issues of narcotic trafficking and human trafficking in post-Soviet Central Asia in the broader international security debate. It offers a constructive critique of the role that the Copenhagen School's "securitisation" framework can play in helping us understand international organizations' involvement in countering narcotic

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[1] The first draft of this paper was presented at the Research Workshop on Illegal Migration and Non-Traditional Security, 10-11 October 2004, Beijing. The workshop was held in conjunction with the Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong; Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore; and the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, CASS, Beijing. The author would like to thank all the participants for their comments. Travel to Central Asia was supported by a fellowship for the Canadian Consortium on Human Security and research was carried out at the Center of International Relations, University of British Columbia.

[2] Peter Stalker, Workers without frontiers - The impact of globalization on international migration, ILO, Geneva and Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000. Stalker argues that argues that flows of goods and capital between rich and poor countries will not be large enough to offset the needs for employment in poorer countries. Instead, social disruption caused by economic restructuring is likely to shake more people loose from their communities and encourage them to look abroad for work.

trafficking and human trafficking in post Soviet Central Asia[3]. In specific, it seeks to answer two sets of questions. First, why have international organizations attempted to "securitize" these activities and why has the "securitization" of narcotic trafficking in Central Asia been comparatively more successful than that of human trafficking? Second, how did the process of "securitization" take place and has it led to appropriate strategies to counter these activities?

Securitisation Theory and This Paper's Methodology

Over the past decade, new approaches in security studies have developed with the aim of challenging traditional realist and neo-realist theories. This debate began in response to the claim that the security agenda must be "broadened" to examine threats beyond state and military security, and "deepened" to include individual, social and global concerns.[4] One of the most influential of the new approaches is articulated by Barry Buzan and Ole Waever among others[5], whose collective body of work is known as the Copenhagen School.

The Copenhagen School develops a distinctive "constructivist/realist" position within the larger academic debate on the meaning of security. It identifies five general categories or "sectors" of security: military, environment, economic, societal, and political security. This allows for a focus on traditional as well as non-traditional issues. Within this framework, "securitisation theory" defines "security" not as an objective condition but as the outcome of a specific social process. Securitisation is understood as "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics".[6] In opposition, desecuritisation involves shifting issues from an "emergency mode" back to a normal political process – that is off the security agenda and into the normal realm of public political discourse.

According to the Copenhagen School's theory of securitisation, the means through which issues are said to become securitised are discursive "speech acts". In other words, "securitising actors" - which may be states, international organizations, NGOs etc - use the language of security to convince an audience of the existential nature of a threat. Thus, the focus of the theory is not on what security is in reality, but what is presented and successfully recognized as a threat.

This approach has many positive aspects. It is a useful analytical tool which helps to identify the "securitising actor(s)", the "referent object" (whose existence is threatened)

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[3] By post-Soviet Central Asia I am referring to the five Central Asian states that emerged with the end of the Soviet Union. From now on in this paper Central Asia will be used to refer to these states.

[4] Ken Booth, for example, questioned whose security existing approaches were designed to address. Depending on the referent, security analyses point to different threats and prescribe different solutions. Ken Booth, "Security and Emancipation", Review of International Studies no.17, 1991, pp.313-326.

[5] See for example, Waever, et.al., Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London, Pinter, 1993; Waever, "Securitisation and DeSecuritisation", in ed. R. Lipschutz, On Security New York: Columbia University Press, 1995; Buzan, Waever and Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Boulder, CO, Lynne Rienner, 1998.

[6] Buzan, Waever and Wilde, Security, A New Framework for Analysis, p.23.

and shows how the process of "securitisation" is completed through the "speech act". It is thus especially useful for identifying and describing existing cases of securitisation. On the other hand, it has been criticized by scholars for reasons such as not taking gender into account[7], for not having a broad understanding of political communication beyond the speech act[8], for narrowly reflecting European security context and concerns[9], and for being state-centric (because the act of securitizing is still left to the state).[10] This paper will examine the validity of these criticisms through an exploration of the securitisation (and politicization) of narcotic trafficking and human trafficking in Central Asia. These case studies have been chosen because there has been a lot of recent rhetoric about both types of trafficking. Also, narcotic trafficking has been more successfully securitised than human trafficking and therefore they make an interesting comparison.

The first section of the paper carefully examines and compares the issues of narcotic and human trafficking in post-Soviet Central Asia. It defines the existential "threats", asks who is threatened and from what. It then looks at the main securitizing actors (international organizations, regional organizations and Central Asian states) and explores whether they shared common perceptions and concerns about these activities. It concludes that clashing "security concepts" in the case of human trafficking partly explain why it has received less attention.

The second section examines the motivations of key international actors in attempting to put these issues onto the political agenda. In other words, it asks *why* securitisation takes place i.e. what motivations and catalysts encouraged actors to articulate narcotic and human trafficking in security terms? It briefly compares the motivations of international actors within those of regional organizations and the Central Asian states.

The paper discovers that the major actors (international, regional and domestic) were motivated to securitise both narcotic and human trafficking based on similar broad factors: i.e. evolving norms; self-interest; changing geopolitics and understandings of

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[7] Lene Hansen, "The Little Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School", Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol.29, no.2, pp.285-306; Caroline Kennedy-Pipe, "Whose Security? State-Building and the 'Emancipation' of Women in Central Asia, International Relations, vol.18, no.1, 2004, pp.91-107; Melissa G. Curley, "Security and Illegal Migration in Northeast Asia"

[8] Williams emphasizes the shift towards visual media as a key challenge for Securitisation theory. Michael C. Williams, "Words, Images, Enemies: Securitisation and International Politics", International Studies Quarterly, vol., 47, 2003, pp.511-531.

[9] For example, William Tow, "Alternative Security Models: Implications for ASEAN", in A. Tan and K. Boutin (eds.), Non-Traditional Security Issues in Southeast Asia, Singapore: Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 2001.

[10] The securitization framework is criticized for remaining state-centric by the "bottom up" approach of constructivists such as Ken Booth and Mc Sweeney. Booth argues that "Security and emancipation are in fact two sides of the same coin. It is emancipation, not power and order, in both theory and practice, that leads to stable security". Mc Sweeney argues that the term security has become synonymous with realpolitik, the interest of the state. The human part of the human condition has been lost. Ken Booth, "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practise", International Affairs, vo.67, no.3, 1991, pp.527-545; B. McSweeney, Security, Identity and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999.

"new threats"; reaction to terrorist events; and search for new institutional "raison d'être" or national identity.

However, in the case of narcotic trafficking, there was generally more agreement among all the actors (international and domestic) about why is should be securitized. In comparison, the issue of human trafficking was much more debated. In the cases of both narcotic trafficking and human trafficking, actors had common broad understandings of evolving geopolitics and the new security environment, similar reactions to terrorist events (e.g. Sept 11), and were motivated by perceived financial benefits. However, in the case of human trafficking there were significant contestations between the motivations of international organizations and the Central Asian states. They had different underlying norms and beliefs, clashing issues of institutional "raison d'être" and national identity, and opposing fundamental interests. This explains why international actors have had comparatively less success in securitizing human trafficking.

In the third section, the paper examines the process of securitization and the key indicators which tell us *how* an issue is securitized. As highlighted by the Copenhagen school, language is important because it is used by the key securitizing actors to put forward their agenda and to gain political capital. However, in the case of human trafficking, it has not helped the marginalized (those trafficked) to advocate their interests. The paper also discovers other indicators of securitisation (not explored by the Copenhagen school) which include: the linkage of issues with another previously recognized threat (in this case narcotic trafficking with terrorism); institutional and administrative changes; and resource allocation.

In the fourth section, the paper examines the *effectiveness* of the securitisation of these illicit activities and its impact on actually countering the "threats". Here the paper argues that the influence of the rhetoric on the development of policy must be taken into account in the securitisation framework (which the Copenhagen School does not). Although international and domestic rhetoric has increased about narcotic and, to a lesser extent about human trafficking, this has not led to the most appropriate or effective actions. Why is the act of securitisation often only a rhetorical device which has not always resulted in appropriate or effective policy actions to counter the two types of trafficking?

The paper concludes with an assessment of the contributions and critiques of the Copenhagen School's concept of securitization for the study of narcotic and human trafficking in Central Asia.. More generally it reviews the role of securitisation as an empirical, theoretical and prescriptive tool.

Section One: Human Trafficking and Narcotic Trafficking

Human and narcotic trafficking in post-Soviet Central Asia are highly complicated issues in which it is difficult to untangle the "real" versus "perceived" threats. Some of the "facts" are contested. We will see that the referent of security (whose security is threatened) varies depending on the actor's security concept.

International organizations, the Central Asian states and societies, and the migrants themselves hold substantially different views and perceptions about human trafficking. They differ widely on whether or not it is a significant threat, and to whom. There is more consensus about narcotic trafficking which is perceived as a more serious and immediate issue which threatens state and global security, and one that they can counter more effectively than human trafficking.

1. Human Trafficking

The most common form of people trafficking in Central Asia is labour migration, followed by trafficking of women and children for prostitution or sexual exploitation. More rare are cases of trafficking of women for domestic servitude, and the trafficking of women and children to convey drugs. The few studies of human trafficking in post-Soviet Central Asia show that the problem seems to be growing, that the routes can rapidly change, and that there has been little awareness in Central Asia about this issue.[11]

Labour migration

Central Asian states have substantial numbers of irregular labour migrants, most of whom travel (illegally, without proper documentation) to Russia or Kazakhstan for work. The poorest Central Asian state, Tajikistan, has the highest number of irregular labour migrants estimated in 2004 at approx. 200,000 to 400,000.[12] These numbers include some long-term migrants, but mostly itinerant workers usually involved in construction and farm work, and "shopping migrants" (mostly women) who travel abroad to purchase articles to be resold at home.[13] There is also a small minority of cases in which men are known to have been lured abroad and then forced into dangerous and even deadly "betting" sports.[14]

Generally, labour migrants travel abroad knowing what kind of work they will be doing. However, they do not anticipate that they may be severely exploited. They are "pushed" to leave home due to poverty and "pulled" abroad towards employment opportunities. Irregular labour migrants in Central Asia do not have the same protection rights as regular citizens and are therefore especially vulnerable to exploitation by underground employers. Throughout the CIS, criminal groups (known as "roofs") operate in various industrial, trade and transport sectors and prey on labour migrants, and especially shuttle traders. Shopping migrants, for example, work in markets which are generally divided into zones, each controlled by a different criminal gang. These gangs require a sum to be

[11] Personal Interview with Michael Tschanz, Chief of Mission, IOM Almaty, October, 2003. And Personal Interview with Kakoli Ray, Chief of Mission, IOM Bishkek, October 2003.

[12] This figure is significantly down from 800,000 during the peak years in 1998-99. Statistics from Sharq research centre. "Tajik Migration Slows", RFE/RL, volume 8, no. 72, 19 April 2004.

[13] Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan, A Study in Trafficking in Women and Children, Dushanbe, IOM, July 2001

[14] Dmitry Poletaev, paper on the reception of migrations in different Russian regions, presented at the conference on Multilateral Organisations in the Caucasus and Central Asia, NUPI, Oslo, 10-11 June 2004.

handed over at the end of the day. The victims have little or no recourse to the local police as the police themselves are often directly involved in the crimes. Labour migrants are also the targets of outright robbery by criminal gangs which keep track of where they live, their daily routine and how much money they make. According to the IOM, every fourth Tajik migrant construction worker has had to pay protection money. [15]

Sex Traffic

The collapse of the Soviet Union has also meant that there are millions more people which traffickers can recruit to provide sexual services. The largest numbers are from the western CIS states such as Moldova and Ukraine; however the problem is growing in Central Asia too. Trafficking figures vary across the region, with the five Central Asian states being either source, transit or destination countries (or some combination thereof). Most are trafficked within the former Soviet Union, to the Middle East (UAE, Iran, Syria, and Saudi Arabia), Europe, and Asia (including Thailand, India, Pakistan, South Korea and China). [16]

As in the case of illegal labour migrants, the majority of women and men in Central Asia who migrate abroad to engage in sex work for commercial purpose generally also do so voluntarily. According to Michael Tschanz of the International Organization of Migration (IOM), most (but not all) are fully aware of what they are moving abroad to do.[17] There are generally recruited through friends, family and newspaper advertisements. [18] They tend to be of Slavic origin. Most of the victims are young women with economic difficulties. Intermediaries lure these women with lucrative job proposals and promise them high wages abroad. They accept because they feel they have no alternative but to face unfavourable work conditions. Poverty deprives them of individual choice.

Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan reportedly have the largest numbers of women being trafficked abroad. The IOM estimates that some 4000 Kyrgyz per year are sold into

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[15] Labour Migration From Tajikistan, IOM, Dushanbe, July 2003, p.87.

[16] Trafficking varies across the region. **Kazakhstan** is a source, transit, and destination country for people trafficking from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan for purposes of sexual exploitation and force labour. Victims are trafficking through and from Kazakhstan to Russia, the UAE, Turkey, Israel, Greece, South Korea, the Czech Republic, Western Europe etc. Internal trafficking from rural to urban areas also takes place. **Kyrgyzstan** is a source and transit country for women, men and children trafficking to Kazakhstan and Russia for forced labour, and to the UAE, South Korea, Turkey and China for sexual exploitation. Women who are transiting tend to come from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. There is also internal migration. **Tajikistan** is mostly a source country for men, women and children trafficking to Russia, other CIS countries and the Gulf States for sexual exploitation and forced labour. **Uzbekistan** is primarily a source, and to a less extent, a transit country for people trafficking to the UAE, Gulf States, India, Malaysia, South Korea, Japan, Thailand, Turkey, Russia and Western Europe. There is also internal migration. Ibid.

[17] "Central Asia: Special Report on Human Trafficking", IRIN 21 October, 2003.

[18] They are recruited by a variety of techniques including false promises of a job abroad; false promises of lucrative and safe sex work abroad; wedding a false groom who is in fact a trafficker; coercion into force prostitution, servitude and drug conveying on the basis of debt bondage and physical threats; false promise of a shopping trip to earn money by reselling purchased items, and in a small minority of cases, kidnapping. Trafficking of children for removal of organs has been reported in Tajikistan. Deceived Migrants from Tajikistan, A Study in Trafficking in Women and Children, Dushanbe, IOM, July 2001, p.16.

slavery, including men who are taken to Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Russia for work on tobacco plantations, farms and construction sites. Women are sent especially to China, Gulf States, South Korea and Europe. There is also some evidence of young women from Central Asia being taken on a "circuit" of Thailand, Malaysia, Hong Kong and Macau, facilitated by Central Asian and Russian organized crime networks operating out of Bangkok.[19] Meanwhile, some estimate that as many as 200,000 foreign women pass through Kyrgyzstan each year to be sold as sexual workers abroad. [20]

What is the Threat? Who/what is Threatened?

International organizations, the Central Asian states and societies, and the migrants themselves hold substantially different views and perceptions about human trafficking in Central Asia. They differ widely on whether or not it is a significant threat, and to whom.

International organizations' Perceptions

Broadly speaking, most international organizations perceive human trafficking to be a threat to individual and global security from both direct and indirect causes. To use the language of the Copenhagen School, the referent objects (those whose security is being threatened) are the individuals whose rights are violated (at home and abroad) as well as the wider global community (which is also perceived to be at risk because of the transnational nature of the crimes).

International organizations working in Central Asia tend to perceive the act of human trafficking predominantly as a threat to human security and a violation to human rights. This is because it deprives people of basic human dignity and jeopardizes individual and public health. The many human rights violations associated with human trafficking include lack of freedom of movement (generally passports are taken away); police extortion and arbitrary detention (law enforcement officers are often in collusion with criminal networks); physical, sexual, and mental abuse etc. Human trafficking is perceived as a threat to global security because it is understood to be part of a larger phenomenon of illegal migration and transnational organized crime which may threaten global governance and states around the world.

International organizations perceive individual and global security to *be threatened by* criminal groups involved in the trafficking of humans (those who profit from luring people to travel illegally abroad often exploiting them in the process). The underlying conditions (or indirect factors) contributing to human trafficking include an array of structural and societal factors (high unemployment, poor economies, gender

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[19] UN Office on Drugs and Crime, "Human Trafficking – Regional Profile 2003-03-11", at http://www.unodc.un.or.th/material/document/RegionalProfile.pdf

[20] "Kyrgyzstan Struggles to Stop Slave Trade", Eurasia Net, July 12, 2004.
The numbers from Tajikistan are much smaller. According to the IOM, 646 Tajik women were forcibly trafficked from the country in 2002, most to the Personal Gulf, but also to Southeast Asia, South Korea, Turkey and Europe. Antonia Blua, "Tajikistan: Human Trafficking A Growing Concern", Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 22 April, 2004.

discrimination, global demand and inequalities etc). However the majority of international programs are focused on catching the criminals, and a minority on helping individuals directly affected by human trafficking (rarely on countering the underlying causes)

Central Asian states' Perceptions

While international organizations tend to perceive human trafficking as an activity which jeopardizes human and global security, governments and societies in Central Asia generally ignore the issue. Central Asian states do not believe that human trafficking is a serious or immediate threat to their national security. Individual and human rights are largely dismissed by the highly authoritarian states, and thus the plight of individuals being trafficked is ignored. Within the predominantly Muslim societies of the region, it is still almost taboo to openly discuss the trafficking of women for prostitution. Victims often do not report their experiences to the police for fear that the conservative societies in the region will reject them. Central Asian societies have difficulty accepting victims of trafficking who often face more crises if and when they return home.

Nevertheless, over the past couple years, some of the Central Asian states (e.g. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan) have become increasing aware of the phenomenon of human trafficking as a threat to the state (as opposed to individuals). They do not portray it as an urgent human security issue but rather as part of the larger phenomenon of illegal migration, crime and state security. Human trafficking is understood to fuel corruption and organized crime and thus undermine state power. Moreover, it is seen as negative because when people leave to work elsewhere they may harm state economies and employment strategies. However, as will be explored later in the paper, human trafficking is also a security dichotomy in that it allows people to work abroad and survive in a poor home economy when the state can not help them. There is also the possibility that the states themselves may be involved in trafficking rings.

Individuals' Perceptions

In some cases, migrants' lives are directly threatened by the traffickers or by the conditions in which they find themselves. However, as described above, although most are, to various degrees, exploited, many also choose to go abroad for employment. Thus, many of the trafficked women who are returned home choose to return to re-enter the trafficking rings. In the perspective of the migrant, human trafficking can be life-threatening but is more often considered as necessary for human survival.[21] The real threat for these migrants comes not from the traffickers but directly from the state or the international organizations which prevent them from seeking employment abroad – and more broadly from the conditions which sustain trafficking (lack of employment etc).

[21] Private correspondence and unpublished study by Umida Khashimova, UNODC, Almaty.

2. Narcotic Trafficking

Drugs Flows

Post-Soviet Central Asia is not a major producer of narcotics, but over the past decade it has become the major transit route for narcotics from Afghanistan moving towards Russia, Eastern and then Western Europe. Large-scale opium production in Afghanistan began with the civil war in 1979, but did not explode until after the Soviet withdrawal and civil war in 1992, when production reach almost half of the world's production i.e. 2000 tons. Today, close to three-quarters of the world's heroin supply originates from opium cultivation in Afghanistan.[22]

Much of this heroin is smuggled via multiple methods of transportation across the mountainous Afghan-Tajik border which is very difficult to patrol, and then on through the other post-Soviet Central Asian states.[23] The drug routes change over time and are hard to pinpoint, however the flow of narcotics is also generally understood to pass directly from Afghanistan to Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Hashish from Afghanistan transits Tajikistan en route to Europe. Drugs from China and Southeast Asia are also reported to be increasingly trafficked through Central Asia causing some experts to forecast that Central Asia is "set to become a global hub for drug trafficking".[24] Meanwhile, chemicals used in the illicit manufacturing of heroin flow in the opposite direction.

This flow of illegal narcotics through Central Asia is a relatively new phenomenon since under the Soviet regime the Tajik-Afghan border was in effect closed. Traditionally, most of the drugs from Afghanistan were transferred through the open Iranian border and trafficked along the "Balkan route" (Afghanistan-Iran-Turkey-Balkan states-Western Europe).[25] Over the past decade, traffickers found easier and more accessible routes to Europe through the weak and corrupt Central Asian states.

The flow of drugs crossing these states has steadily increased – particularly with the defeat of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.[26] In 2001, the area in Afghanistan under poppy cultivation decreased to 7,606 ha because of the Taliban's ban on cultivation. In 2002, the area under cultivation drastically increased once again to 74,000 ha and has been increasing ever since. These large quantities of narcotics are increasingly being

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[22] In 1999, almost 95 per cent of world opium production was concentrated in just two countries: Afghanistan and Myanmar. The United Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), World Drug Report 2002, p.160.

[23] The Tajik government estimates that 80% of the narcotics produced in Afghanistan are smuggled across the border into Tajikistan. USAID says that this may be overestimated in view of a recent increase in use of the route through Turkmenistan. A substantial amount of heroin continues to flow from Afghanistan directly into Iran.

[24] Niklas Swanstrom, "The Southeast Asia and Chinese Connection to Drug Trade in Central Asia", Central Asia – Caucasus Analyst, 27 August, 2003.

[25] Status Report on Afghanistan; Informal Consultations, UNODC, Vienna, 24 June, 2003, p.4.

[26] "Illicit Drugs Situation in the Regions Neighboring Afghanistan and the Response of the ODC", UNODC Working Paper, November 2002. See also Annual Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002. www.inch.org/e/ind_ar.htm

transported along major transportation routes allegedly with the complicity of key state officials.

What is the Threat? Who/what is Threatened?

International Organisation's Perceptions

International organizations mostly perceive narcotic trafficking as an immediate and negative threat to the global community. This is because many Western governments consider the trafficking of narcotics via Central Asia as a direct threat to their states and the health of their citizens. As a result, it has received substantially more international attention and funds than human trafficking. Of particular international interest today is the fact that the drug trade has in the past, and may in the future, constitute an important source of funding for terrorist activity.[27] The UNODC claims that the linkages between the drug trade in Central Asia with other areas of organized crime have increased over the past several years.[28]

The international community's second major concern about the illicit drug trade is its negative implications for the stability and development of Central Asian states. They fear that they may become breeding grounds for other transnational threats. For example, as seen in states such as Columbia, the narcotic trade often destabilizes states and civil society and may damage long-term economic development while compromising the rule of law.[29]

Thus, according to international organizations, the referent object (whose security is being threatened) is the global community (especially individuals and states in the West) and to a lesser extent, the Central Asian states. Individuals in the West are perceived to be directly threatened by the cultivation of opium in Afghanistan (and its underlying structural causes including poor economic conditions and unemployment in Afghanistan). However, the international community's specific concerns about post-Soviet Central Asia are because of its porous borders, corruption and crime which are allowing the transit of narcotics towards the West. The other side of the equation, the demand for narcotics from the West, remains comparatively unexamined in this context.

Central Asian States' Perceptions

Central Asian states share international concerns about the implications of narcotic trafficking on the stability of their states and the potential resulting damage to long-term economic development. Some regional economies are becoming increasingly criminalized and controlled by drug money. It is significant, for example, that the drug

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[27] Particularly by local groups such as the Northern Alliance and IMU which were involved in heroin trade. This will be examined below.
[28] Personal Interviews with UNODC officials in Vienna and Bishkek.
[29] Some argue that the drug routes follow areas in which there have been military conflicts e.g. Tajikistan, Georgia, Moldova, Chechnya, Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the Central Asian states are basically transit states located between areas of supply (Afghanistan) and demand (Europe).

trade in Central Asia is currently expanding in areas which are weak or in conflict with the central government e.g. Tajikistan, southern Kyrgyzstan, and parts of Xingjian in China. Also, the general perception is that levels of crime are increasing and are related to the drug business. However, there are no national systems to record these trends.

Thus, for the Central Asian states, the referent object (whose security is threatened) is the state. However, they tend to believe that the cause of their insecurity comes primarily from the supply of narcotics in Afghanistan, and the demand for them from the West. Thus, the international community is perceived to be hypocritical for lecturing the Central Asian states when they are merely a transit region.

Individual' Perceptions

Over the past decade, the trafficking business has greatly increased. Those involved are now generally large criminal groups operating along major transportation routes, sometimes with state complicity. Nevertheless, the issue is of concern to the minority of individual couriers. Their plight is similar to those of other labour migrants. Sometimes people are sometimes forced to carry drugs across borders. Often they have an element of choice in that they decide to do it in order to earn a living.

There has been comparatively little concern among international organizations or Central Asian states about how the drug trade has led to a whole array of health and societal problems, particularly among the young and unemployed.[30] As incomes have diminished from farming and agriculture, more people have turned to the drug trade for employment and the number of drug users has substantially increased. There is concern that the increase in drug trafficking and in-kind payments to drug couriers is leading to the rapid spread of drug abuse throughout Central Asia. There are approximately 720 drug addicts for every 100,000 inhabitants in Central Asia as a whole, the state with the highest rate being Kyrgyzstan.[31] Medical infrastructure in the region is highly inadequate and cannot address the population's growing need for addiction treatment and rehabilitation. The spread of HIV/AIDS has increased among the population[32] and the targeting of women as couriers has led to an array of new social problems.[33] However, these human security issues have been ignored in comparison to the issues of crime and trafficking.

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[30] J. Maitland .Summary of Fact Finding Mission to Tajikistan, Peak Options Consulting for Soros Foundation, Open Society Institute, International Harm Reduction Development Program. This mission ran from July 30th to August 9th 2000.

[31] Annual Report of the International Narcotics Control Board for 2002, p.64. www.inch.org/e/ind_ar.htm The UN estimates that 0.9% of the population age 15 and above consumes opiates, which is three times the ratio for the corresponding demographic group in Western Europe.

[32] Drug abuse by injection is the prime cause of the rapid spread of HIV/AIDS in Central Asia.

[33] Nancy Lubin writes that customs officials allegedly crack down on the women and allow larger shipments of drugs to go through. Nancy Lubin, "Who's Watching the Watchdogs?" Journal of International Affairs, vol.56, no.2, Spring 2003, pp.43-56, p.49.

Conclusions:

From the section above we can see that the "referent of security" varies depending on the actor's "security concept". Actors' security concepts clashed in the case of human trafficking and this helps to explain why international organizations have had less success in securitising this illicit activity. In the case of narcotic trafficking, the securitizing actors (international organizations and the Central Asian state) invoked state and global security to get attention focused on the issue. Both international organizations and the Central Asian states perceive narcotic trafficking to be a direct and immediate threat to the states themselves. International organizations also see it as a threat to the global (western) community. Therefore, all the actors involved in examining this issue agree that urgent action needs to be taken. As a result of this consensus we will see below that more, if not enough, funds have been pumped into counter-narcotic activities.

The issue of human trafficking has received comparatively much less attention largely because of key securitising actors' clashing security concepts. The key actors attempting to securitise this issue have been some international organizations such as the International Organization on Migration (IOM), and a very few NGOs, who perceive human trafficking primarily as a humanitarian issue and secondly as a global security issue. This focus on "human security" as their key security concept clashed with the thinking of the authoritarian Central Asian states and societies who rarely acknowledge human trafficking as a serious issue. When they do, it is not seen as a human or societal security issue, but one linked to state security. As for the illegal migrants themselves (those who are trafficked) they have also been unable or unwilling to articulate their plight as a security issue.

Section Two: Motivations for Securitising Narcotic and Human Trafficking

International organizations have played the greatest role in attempting to securitize narcotic and human trafficking in Central Asia. Therefore, this section derives key motivations or catalysts which encourage international organizations to securitize narcotic and human trafficking, and compares them to those of regional institutions and domestic states. We discover that these key securitizing actors shared common broad understandings of evolving geopolitics and the new security environment, and similar reactions to catastrophic events (e.g. Sept 11). However, in the case of human trafficking, international and domestic actors had clashing norms and beliefs, issues of institutional "raison d'être" and national identity, and opposing fundamental interests. This explains why international actors had less success in securitizing human trafficking. Ultimately, as predicted by the Copenhagen school framework, the Central Asian states have had the final control over which issues are acted upon and how.

International Organizations

In response to new post-1991 geopolitical and security realities, an alphabet soup of international organizations raced into post-Soviet Central Asia with a variety of bilateral

"transition" projects. They attempted, generally with little success, to contribute to economic, political and development reforms of specific states. However, beginning in the late 1990s, but especially since the events of September 11, 2001, this approach has been mostly overshadowed by a focus on certain transnational security issues which became widely perceived by the international community as global threats (and much more rarely as threats to human security). In particular, international organizations have outlined numerous policies and initiated many programs to counter illicit activities such as "terrorism", human trafficking, narcotic trafficking, and arms trafficking in the region.

There are four main international institutions which have, to various degrees, attempted to securitise human and narcotic trafficking in Central Asia: The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the International Organization on Migration (IOM), and most recently the European Union (EU). These institutions were motivated to politicize (if not securitise) these issues for mostly similar, but also some differing reasons, which will be outlined below.

In comparison, regional institutions such as the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization have concentrated solely on the issue of narcotic trafficking. The five Central Asian states themselves differ widely in their perceptions and actions, however, overall they have attempted to securitize narcotic trafficking and ignored human trafficking.

1. Common motivations

International organizations, regional organizations and the Central Asian states (with the exception of Turkmenistan) share some similar motivations for attempting to politicize narcotic and human trafficking. These include their similar broad understandings of evolving geopolitics and the emergence of "new threats" in the region, as well as their reactions to terrorist events within Central Asia and in the United States.

Changing Geopolitics and Perceptions of New Threats

Globalization, the break-up of the Soviet Union and the resulting porous borders among the new Eurasian states, help to explain why international programs aimed at countering "new security threats" were suddenly perceived to be needed by the international community. They also help to explain why old security threats e.g. military threats, have been comparatively desecuritised.

Overall, the location of Central Asia between Europe and Asia, the weak institutional capacities of the states to manage migration, the absence of appropriate legislation, and the high level of corruption have contributed to the (largely correct, if overstated) perception that this region is a convenient route for legal and illegal migration. The Central Asian states' weak economies, high unemployment, dramatic social and economic changes, and weak human rights records have also contributed to this

perception. It is moreover widely (and somewhat more controversially) believed that criminal and terrorist organizations have taken advantage of inadequate legal, judicial and law enforcement structures, porous borders and endemic corruption among state officials.

These shared perceptions of realities help to explain why international organizations have become increasingly concerned about narcotic and human trafficking. As a result, in October 2000, for example, the Austrian Chairmanship organized the OSCE's first conference on "An Integrated Approach to Counter Drugs, Organized Crime and Terrorism". The perceptions of "new threats" articulated at this conference have subsequently been continually repeated in OSCE policy statements.

These perceptions of new dangers are also shared by regional security institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) which has not made serious efforts to develop cooperation over traditional military defence issues. Instead, it has concentrated on terrorism, narcotic trafficking and crime. As for the Central Asian states, they too have adopted similar rhetoric about the emergence of new threats. However, the more independent and militarized (respectively Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) states remain wary about cooperation with the international community (and perhaps even more so with their neighbours) and are still focused on traditional defence issues.

September 11th, the war in Afghanistan, and Terrorist Acts in Central Asia

International organizations, regional organizations and Central Asian states also restructured their priorities in reaction to a series of terrorist acts in Central Asia[34], and the September 11 attack on the United States. In 2001 and 2002, with Afghanistan the geographic centre of the US "war on terror", the nearby Central Asian states were suddenly at the forefront of international security policy. This new global security environment meant that international organizations and their donors were suddenly much more interested in the region. Projects that could be seen to be related to countering terrorism were understood as the most important and thus more likely to be funded.

Then the events of September 11th and the subsequent global "war on terrorism," significantly shaped international thinking and policies related to security. Subsequently there was heightened rhetoric about trafficking activities and the need for global attention on these issues. The European Union's motivations for securitizing trafficking, for example, are outlined in the EU's Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-2006. The Paper explains why the EU has adopted a new emphasis on transnational security issues: "The tragic events of 11 September 2001 and subsequent events in Afghanistan have had a significant impact on Central Asia and led to a widespread re-evaluation of political and foreign policy priorities, both within the EU and elsewhere".[35] The paper goes on to add that "The EU has a strong interest in preventing Central Asia from becoming a zone of conflict, a haven for terrorism or a major provider of terrorist financing. Central Asia is

[34] These began before 9/11 with the armed insurgency in 1999 and 2000 in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
[35] Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia ,p.4

the main transit route to Western Europe for drugs produced in Afghanistan, and a major source of trafficking in small arms and human beings".[36]

In the case of the OSCE, it responded by expanding its core objectives to include a special emphasis on countering "terrorism". In December 2001, the OSCE held a conference on "Strengthening Comprehensive Efforts to Counter Terrorism. In 2002, it developed a charter on preventing and combating terrorism which defines terrorism as a collective threat that should be addressed in a comprehensive way.[37] The charter explicitly states its determination to counter cross-border security threats (including narcotic and human traffickers) as part if its plan prevent and counter international terrorism. Regional institutions and states also shared this desire to counter terrorism (generally used to define Islamic extremism), often over-exaggerating its impact to gain international attention on the issue.

Financial Benefits

A cynical realist might argue that international organizations and the Central Asian states were largely motivated to securitise trafficking activities based on the funding they could receive from the international community in the post 9/11 context. For international organizations, policies which targeted certain activities (e.g. crime and terrorism) became easier to justify to member states and donors. As for the Central Asian states, they are quite poor and most (especially Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan) have been eager to receive funding or aid from the international community. However, they have often received funding for adopting appropriate rhetoric and policy statements, but not followed through on the actual policies.

2. Clashing Motivations

International organizations and the Central Asian states also had divergent motivations for wanting or not wanting to securitize narcotic and human trafficking. They had conflicting norms and beliefs, divergent issues of institutional "raison d'être" and states' national identity, and opposing fundamental interests. These clashing motivations show how difficult it has been for the international community to securitize human trafficking.

Norms and Beliefs

The recent international focus on human and narcotic trafficking in Central Asia reflects (as seen above) the widespread adoption of a shared belief among members of international organizations that these clandestine activities are increasingly destabilizing states, endangering human lives, and that they may sometimes pose a threat to global security. There is also broad agreement among most international organizations that developing states are particularly vulnerable.

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[36] Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia, p.18
[37] See for example the OSCE Charter on Preventing and Combating Terrorism, 2002. http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/antiterrorism/oscechapter_at.pdf

However, the current international focus on "new security threats" also reflects a more fundamental change in thinking about international security and sovereignty which has been evolving over the past decade. Previously, the protection of the state – its boundaries, peoples and institutions – was understood to be the responsibility of that particular state. Today, in contrast, there is a belief commonly held by the international community that international organizations should become involved, when and where possible, in vulnerable states to help them counter these clandestine transnational activities. Thus, many organizations have developed policies based on the fundamental belief that the international community has a moral and practical duty to help counter these activities.

These international norms clash with regional and state norms in Central Asia. Regional multilateral institutions, such as the CIS and SCO, are based upon the understanding that they can solve their own problems, through cooperative regional security, without the interference of the world community. Thus, SCO members have agreed to draw up a multilateral program because, to quote Kazakhstan's President Nazarbaev, only "mutual efforts" among regional states can combat acts of terrorism, crime and violence.[38] Central Asian states are apprehensive and reluctant, to varying extents about allowing the international community to become involved in what they consider to be the internal affairs of their counties. In particular, "interference" in human rights issues such as human trafficking is not welcome.

Therefore, the norms which lie behind international organizations' attempts to deal with clandestine transnational activities have clashed with regional and state norms, especially over the issue of human trafficking. This has hindered the adoption of policies to counter human trafficking and help its victims.

Self-interest

International organizations and the Central Asian states were motivated to securitize illicit activities that they believed directly affected their self-interest. They were particularly interested in securitizing narcotic trafficking because it was perceived as the greater danger to their *own* member states and peoples. For example, in the case of the OSCE, once trafficking activities were perceived to "affect all [OSCE] participating states", countering them came to be seen as integral to the OSCE's mission. In the case of the EU, it began to prioritize anti-narcotic and border management projects in Central Asia after a 1999 report concluded that there were 1.5 million heroin addicts in Europe and that ninety percent of this heroin was coming from Afghanistan. As a result, the subsequent EU strategy paper on Central Asia argued that it was necessary to "reduce flows… towards the EU".

Regional organizations (SCO and CIS) and the Central Asian states had their own unique perceptions and interests. Although narcotic trafficking is understood to be a threat to the

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[38] For example, Nazarbaev, "Frontier Services of SCO developing interaction mechanisms, Pravda, 24 April, 2002.

stability of their states, there are many more pressing issues, and there is little political will or financial ability to counter either type of trafficking. Nevertheless, Central Asian states and the CIS have been attempting to securitise *terrorism* along with narcotic trafficking since the early 1990s, i.e. well before any involvement from international institutions.

Security Dichotomies

Central Asian states do not have clear-cut motivations to securitize, however, because for them human and narcotic trafficking are security dichotomies. They are ambiguous "threats" that may also have positive elements or benefits. As was seen in section one, they allow people to work abroad and survive in a poor home economy when the state can not help them. Not only that, but there are many signs that the states themselves may be involved in trafficking rings. In this sense, human trafficking may be positive or even necessary for both individuals and states to survive. In Tajikistan, for example, approximately thirty percent of the population is estimated to be financially dependent on the illicit drug business. As for human trafficking, the IOM states that many of the trafficked women who are returned home chose to return to re-enter the trafficking rings. It is difficult then to argue that their states should securitise these issues, when a majority of the people do not wish them to do so.

Also, a significant percentage of the state budgets of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan comes from narcotic trafficking. This certainly makes it difficult for the state to "securitise" narcotic trafficking because the state itself is directly involved or complicit in the trafficking business. This relationship also leads to a clash between global governance which focuses on states and international cooperation, and the Central Asian states which themselves are part of the problem. All of the Central Asian states are "weak states" in that they have low levels of legitimacy; weak border controls; representatives of the state who place personal, tribal and factional goals above the public interest; lack of economic or social provision for their citizens; and often no fair and efficient criminal justice. Some of the Central Asian states in fact seem to be developing what Roy Godson has called a "political-criminal nexus" in which there is a symbiotic relationship between criminals and politics where they provide each other with mutual benefits. Finally, there is also the legal and definitional question of how to identify trafficking as illegal. There is a very fuzzy distinction between criminal and non-criminal activities in the former Soviet Union.

Evolving "Raison d'être" and Forging of National Identity

Further motives for securitisation were based on international and regional organizations' evolving understandings of their "raison d'être" which sometimes clashed with Central Asian states' attempts to forge their national identity. All the international and regional organizations involved in Central Asia have been trying to define or redefine their roles. With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the evolving security environment has meant that old security institutions (e.g. NATO and UN) have been desperately trying to redefine themselves in relation to the new environment.

Meanwhile, newer security institutions (e.g. OSCE and SCO) have been attempting to develop a central role for themselves. Thus the 2004 OSCE Chairman-in-Office called for a major reorganization of the OSCE in light of contemporary security priorities, EU enlargement, NATO's transformation and the evolution of other organizations.[39]

Meanwhile, the Central Asian states themselves are relatively new, so that states. Therefore, identifying threats has been a major part of their process of identity and nation-building. Many of the states understand that they can not safely secure their borders on their own and that they need funds and expertise. Most are therefore eager to cooperate with international organizations, although not with each other. Safe and secure borders are necessary for these relatively new states not only to define their territory (many are still disputed) but also to project an image of moral resolve and to establish the authority and legitimacy of their states. Overall, countering narcotic trafficking (as opposed to human trafficking) fits better with attempts of the relatively new Central Asian states to forge their identities and define their borders.

Section Three: The Process of Securitisation

The main indicators of the securitisation of trafficking activities in Central Asia include an increase in rhetoric and use of the language of security to define trafficking as a threat. However, securitization also occurred through the development of a "security continuum" linking trafficking with terrorism; through institutional and administrative changes; and with an increase in the allocation of funds to deal with illicit activities. The difficulty in outlining the process of securitisation, as will be seen below, is that there is a lack of clarity over the definition of securitisation and how to measure it, as well as and some confusion over whether it is a descriptive, theoretical or prescriptive framework.

1. How Securitisation Occurs

Language

As the Copenhagen School suggests, changes in language can help us understand when an issue is securitised. International organizations in Central Asia often used the language of security to define narcotic and human trafficking, and to put forth their agenda. They also used different terms to lump together illicit activities into a single rhetorical "threat package". For example, the SCO's main security goals are to combat the "three evil forces" of terrorism, extremism, and separatism" as well as narcotic trafficking.[40] The UNODC focuses on Central Asia because it "occupies a very special place in international efforts against the 'uncivil forces' of our time: drug traffickers, organized

[39] Transcript of Speech by H.E. Dr. Solomon Passy, OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria, at the 13th Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, Edinburgh, 5 July, 2004. p.7.
[40] "St. Petersburg Summit of SCO Concludes with Rich Fruit," Xinhua News Agency, June 7, 2002.

crime groups and terrorists alike.[41] The OSCE stresses the need to promote human rights and to counter terrorism, organized crime and illegal trade which are termed "the new risks and challenges to our security".[42] As we will see below, by packaging the threats together, international institutions have encouraged the adoption of similar traditional security strategies to counter these largely distinct activities.

Development of a "security continuum"

While powerful rhetoric around trafficking has helped sell a concern about these activities, terrorism has increased the rhetoric tenfold. International organizations and Central Asian states have used language to securitise trafficking by linking it with terrorism. Thus, especially after 9/11, they rhetorically packaged terrorism with other transnational crimes in Central Asia. In particular, terrorism was grouped with narcotic trafficking, often exaggerating the links between them.[43] To quote Didier Bigo, after September 11th, a network of security professionals around the world "articulated a continuum between borders, terrorism, crimes and migration".[44] Central Asia was not an exception.

UN Security Resolution 1378 (28 September, 2001) noted the close connection between international terrorism and organized crime (including the trafficking of arms and drugs, money laundering and the smuggling of deadly materials). Thereafter, international and domestic actors increasingly *assumed* links among these activities. All the international organizations in Central Asia used the assumption that links or "networks" exist among terrorists and traffickers to justify new policies. Irregular migration also was associated with both narcotic and human trafficking and thus has become widely perceived as a security threat.

In just one of multiple examples of the packaging of narcotic and human trafficking with terrorism, the EU Strategy Paper states that: "In Central Asia and the wider region, terrorist forces and their support groups operate in close liaison with transnational crime networks, smuggling drugs, arms and human beings…"[45] The analysis of terrorism and crime links is no academic exercise; it serves to discover how vulnerable terrorist groups are and thus helps in dismantling them. As a result of this type of thinking, the EU's new border management programs are coordinated with the other anti-drugs, anti-terrorism and anti-organized crime projects.[46]

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[41]Quote from Antonio Maria Costa, Director of UNODC, UNIS/NAR/845, 21 May, 2004. http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2004/unisnar845.html

[42] Quote from Jozias von Aartsen, Conflict Prevention in Central Asia; The Role of the OSCE, P.13.

[43] Nicole Jackson, "The Trafficking of Narcotics, Arms and Humans in Post-Soviet Central Asia: (Mis)perceptions, Policies and Realities", Central Asian Survey

[44] Didier Bigo, "Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease", Alternatives, vol.27, 2002, pp.63-92.

[45] Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia, p.9.

[46] In a second example, in January 2001 the EU initiated its anti-narcotic programs (CADAP 1, CADAP 2) followed by new border management programs (BOMCA) and customs management programs in 2003 and 2004. The overall stated goal of these programs is to stop narcotics from Afghanistan from coming into the European Union. "Short Review on EU programmes to fight drugs along the Heroin Route", EuropeAid Co-operation Office, European Commission, Brussels, 15 May, 2003, AIDCO A.3/SK-PEC/D (2003).

Institutional and administrative changes

Besides changes in language, the process of securitization also occurred through administrative changes within international institutions. For example, the UNODC securitised trafficking by undergoing a complete administrative restructuring in order to "pursue an integrated approach to counter drugs, crime and terrorism". In effect it institutionalized the perceived "security continuum" between the three activities, thus arguably "securitizing" them.[47]

In a second example, the heads of six SCO member states reached consensus on the institutionalisation of the organisation at the 2003 Summit. There they called for extensive cooperation across the world in the fight against terrorism, drug and other cross-border crimes. This rhetoric was followed by the creation of new institutions within the SCO framework. These included the "Bishkek group" which is comprised of the member states' chiefs of law enforcement agencies, border guards and special services; the SCO Secretariat in Beijing, which was inaugurated on January 15, 2004[48]; and the SCO's Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure (RATS) opened in Tashkent in June 2004.[49]

Allocation of Funds and Resources

Finally, securitisation occurred when more resources were allocated to trafficking activities. For example, in 2003 OSCE funds were redirected from the Balkans to support new security projects in Central Asia. In another example, in 2004 the EU suddenly allocated substantial funds to counter new security threats in Central Asia.[50] Both of these examples are key indicators of securitisation.

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[47] Earlier, in October 2002, the UNODC launched its first activities under its Global Programme against Terrorism. Here the UNODC works with the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) which was established under resolution 1373 and has become the UN's leading body to promote collective action against international terrorism. The stated rational for UNODC's participation in this Programme is that some of the measures designed to counter narcotic and organized crime can now be utilized to fight terrorism. Thus, for example, terrorists' violation of the law can, in part, be dealt with by the Convention against TOC. The quote comes from UNODC outlined in its Global Programme Against Terrorism.

[48] Zhang Deguang, former Chinese vice foreign minister and former Chinese ambassador to Russia was appointed the first SCO secretary-general. Khabar Television, Almaty, 13 Aug 03 – posted on Kazakhstan Daily Digest, Eurasianet, August 14, 2003.
http://www.eurasianet.org/resource/kazakhstan/hypermail/200308/0016.shtml

[49] The original RATS was to have been in Bishkek. "SCO Launches Regional Terrorist Body", Xinhua News Agency, June 17, 2004,

[50] The EU indicative budget 2004-2006 for this area is 49 million euros, spread over integrated border management (55% 27 million euros; improving migration and asylum management (20% 10 million euros); and combating organized crime and terrorism (25% 12 million euros). Tacis Regional Cooperation: Strategy Paper and Indicative Program, 2004-2006, p.28.

2. Difficulties with defining the process of securitisation

What is the Definition of "Securitisation"?

The key difficulty in detailing the process of securitisation, is that there is no one agreed upon definition of securitisation. As seen in the introduction, the Copenhagen School describes securitisation as "the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics".[51] It shifts issues from a "normal" political process into an "emergency mode". One problem with this definition is how to understand what is "normal politics", especially in extremely weak states such as Tajikistan. In response to this, Barry Buzan (speaking for Ole Waever) recently said that normal means whatever is normal in different countries, not necessarily Western democracies.[52] However, is the state maintaining the safety and security of its people not normal politics?

The Copenhagen School's definition is also criticized by those who believe that we need a more flexible definition to allow for the various different types of securitisation which can exist. Thus, for Tsuneo Akaha, the securitization framework is a "contested political forum to put issues on or off the agenda". [53] In other words, it is a politicized process as opposed to a crisis situation.

If we strictly apply the Copenhagen School's definition to this study of narcotic and human trafficking, then these areas have not been securitised. Neither international organizations nor Central Asian states have taken emergency measures to deal with these activities However, the case studies do fit the looser definition. Narcotic trafficking has been put on all the securitising actors'(international, regional and domestic) political agendas. Furthermore, the recently assumed links of narcotic trafficking with global terrorism, have certainly moved it more towards being perceived as a crisis situation. On the other hand, human trafficking has been put on the agenda only by some of the international organizations (IOM and OSCE). It has therefore not been properly securitised (by either definition).

How Do we Measure it?

Using either a strict or loose definition of securitisation, there are many difficulties with trying to list the key indicators of such a process. In my two case studies, for example, there is the question of how much money needs to be allocated, or how substantial the administrative changes need to be, before trafficking is considered securitised. Also, not all international organizations are equal or have equal voices in the international community. Some are understood to be more important than others and are funded more

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[51]Buzan, Waever and Wilde, Security, A New Framework for Analysis, p.23.
[52] Barry Buzan comment at BISA, December 2004.
[53] Tsuneo Akaha commenting at the Research Workshop on Illegal Migration and Non-Traditional Security, 10-11 October 2004, Beijing. The workshop was held in conjunction with the Centre of Asian Studies, The University of Hong Kong, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), Singapore and the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies, CASS, Beijing.

than others. The UN, for example, has more funds than the OSCE and therefore may be more able to securitise an issue. And although all the international organizations in these two case studies have used heightened rhetoric to securitise trafficking, this does not explain why the IOM's priority on human security has received the least attention.

Descriptive, Theoretical or Prescriptive Framework?

The third difficulty with trying to define the process of securitisation is confusion over whether it is a descriptive, theoretical or prescriptive framework. As seen in the introduction, for some scholars a key problem with the Copenhagen School's emphasis on language is that it suggests that actors without a voice can not securitise an issue. However, this does seem to be the reality in the case of trafficking in Central Asia. Women in Muslim Central Asia have almost no voice and have been unable to push the issue of trafficking women for prostitution to the head of the international or state security agendas. Instead, issues such a terrorism and narcotic trafficking have received the most attention. Thus, the Copenhagen School's framework is not useful for those who are trying to help the voiceless articulate their concerns, but does accurately capture what is happening. It is a good descriptive framework, but not a good prescriptive tool for those advocating human security.

In another example, the Copenhagen School's framework is attacked for being state centric. Only the state can ultimately securitise non-traditional issues. The problem with saying that only the state can be the securitising actor is that often the traditional security agents of the states are inadequate for dealing with the security problems of that state. Also, states are often a major cause of those very problems. Life threatening issues easily can be excluded from consideration because the government chooses not to deal with them, or because the "voices" are insufficiently loud.

Again, this seems to be an accurate descriptive of the realities in Central Asia. These are highly authoritarian states and it is very difficult for their peoples in general to raise their concerns. This helps to explain why issues that people in Central Asia consider the real challenges to their security (e.g. unemployment and poverty) have received comparatively much less attention than terrorism and trafficking. However, just because this is an accurate description of reality does not mean that it is judged to be a positive situation. To quote Hume, "one can not derive an 'ought' from an 'is'.

Security Dichotomies

Finally, the securitisation framework does not help take into account security dichotomies. It is questionable whether it *would* make a difference to the realities of human trafficking if Central Asian women (or NGOs) were able to politicize this issue. As seen above, human trafficking is a security dichotomy – i.e. many of who are trafficked or who illegally go abroad to work, do so with an element of "choice" and do not want this issue to be securitized. Moreover, it is questionable whether securitization leads to appropriate policy outcomes (this is explored below).

Section Four: Effectiveness of Securitisation

1. Influence of rhetoric on policy

The Copenhagen School's definition of securitisation does not include its impact on policy. Yet surely, once an issue is rhetorically adopted and put on the political agenda, it must affect the development of policy for it to be effective in practice. Otherwise, the activities have only been rhetorically securitised with no practical result.

What has the impact of the process of securitisation been on narcotic and human trafficking in post-Soviet Central Asia? The broad consensus over the need for action to combat narcotic and human trafficking in Central Asia has very recently translated into a proliferation of programs designed to counter both activities – but especially narcotic trafficking. Nevertheless, there is a tremendously long way to go to actually counter these challenges. Despite significant efforts, narcotic trafficking is increasing (largely due to demand and supply – i.e. nothing to due with efforts to control the situation in post-Soviet Central Asia) and some indicators show that human trafficking is also increasing.

2. Why was the process of securitisation hindered?

As seen above in sections one and two, clashing security concepts, and the lack of consensus about human trafficking made it more difficult to develop policies to counter it. However, there were also other factors which prevented both types of trafficking from being effectively countered.

Size of Challenge, Timeframe and Lack of Data

First, these challenges are enormous, and policies to counter them have only existed for the past few years. Narcotic and human trafficking are difficult, if not impossible, to control even in the more prosperous Western states let alone in impoverished developing states with comparatively very porous borders. It is also very difficult to obtain empirical data about whether clandestine activities are being effectively challenged.

Central Asian States' Willingness to Accept International Involvement

The effectiveness of international securitisation was also negated because not all of the Central Asian states were willing to accept international "help" – especially in the area of human trafficking. Thus, for example, OSCE's "human dimension" policies were not welcomed by the authoritarian Central Asian governments who generally interpreted them as infringements upon their sovereignty from "just another human rights organization". Some of the Central Asian states adopted the democratic rhetoric (especially Kyrgyzstan) but went no further. However, OSCE's new efforts to deal with transnational security threats such as terrorism have been comparatively welcomed by the Central Asian states and therefore may have more chance of success.

Lack of implementation mechanisms and lack of funding

Despite a lot of rhetoric, regional organizations in Central Asia have had the least impact on these activities. This is because they lack effective implementation mechanisms and their policy statements have had little if any effect in practice. The best example here is the CIS which has "developed as an organization with free and non-mandatory resolutions, where cooperation has diverse formats, and there is no system of state responsibility to carry out the obligations that states have assumed".[54] In the case of the newly created CIS offshoot, the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), its bodies are currently understaffed, underfinanced and it has achieved little so far. Moreover, two of the Central Asian states, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan, have opted out of the organization.

Similarly, the institutional capacity of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has so far been limited. For example, the new SCO anti-terrorist centre in Tashkent has not yet played a major role because the SCO states are unwilling to exchange hard intelligence material. Uzbekistan, the main regional player, has little faith in the institution, and the Central Asian states have continued to enter into bilateral agreements with US anti-terrorism operations rather than with the SCO.

The effectiveness of securitisation also was limited when international organizations lacked the funds to put their policies into place, or to follow through for the long-term. It was also limited in some cases because the organizations lacked effective decision-making structures. For example, OSCE policies are constrained because it has little money and decisions must be reached on consensus of 55 participating states. The OSCE devotes less than 5% of its total budget to this region, and has only 30 international officers in Central Asia (out of a total of 3,500). This is partly because Central Asia has previously been of low priority and partly because of the resistance of the Central Asian states themselves to any perceived infringements upon their sovereignty. Moreover, because the OSCE Chairman-in-Office rotates every year, he/she can influence the institution's rhetoric for that year only. There is a limit on how much can actually be achieved in such a short period of time.

New Realities

Finally, regional organizations failed to securitise issues because their policy objectives were overtaken by new events on the ground. For example, in 2001 the presence of American military forces in Central Asia injected a new dynamic into regional politics. This major event at first seemed to highlight the weakness of the SCO and CIS frameworks both as security mechanisms and as forums to counter the growing American influence in the region.[55] The activities and stated goals of the SCO and CIS were

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[54] Mariam Arunova, "The CIS: summing up the past decade, and future prospects", Central Asia and the Caucasus, no.3, vol.13, 2002, p.9.

[55] In 2001, the SCO did not exercise a single military or political response to any terrorism-related issue, beyond offering condolence to the US for the 9/11 attacks. This is significant because a core part of the organization's *raison d'être* was to ensure the regional stability of Central Asia by confronting terrorism

sidelined (at least temporarily) with US military involvement in the region. It remains to be seen whether they regional organizations can put into place concrete long-term policies to counter "new threats".

3. Wrong Strategies

There is some evidence that the securitisation of clandestine activities in general may be leading to not the most effective mix of strategies being used to combat them.[56] Most international and state efforts have been in the area of traditional security policies to train militaries, to create safer state borders and to reform security and law enforcement organs. In some cases these are important, however military actions in combating transnational clandestine activities are limited, and borders can never be made totally secure. Even providing training and equipment to law enforcement officials is contentious because many of them are already complicit in these crimes. In the case of human trafficking, these strategies are not only severely limited they often harmful to the migrants. Moreover, " … A vicious cycle is developing whereby Central Asian countries are taking action to limit cross-border movement of peoples and goods in the name of security which, in turn, hinders the legitimate movement of people and goods and the medium-term prospects for economic growth in the region." [57] Also, international organizations' funds may be being siphoned off by the authoritarian states, and used to repress their peoples' human rights

What is most lacking is international cooperation in dealing with the underlying conditions of clandestine activities. It might be helpful if there was less concentration on the transnational side of the clandestine activities (i.e. stopping them from leaving the region) and more on dealing with the development of these phenomena in the first place. There are international programs – by the UN, OSCE, and EU among others – which address issues of good governance, education, democratization and human rights. However, compared to the issues of "new security threats," they receive much less attention and funds. This is a mistake, as human security (countering real threats to individuals' lives and the underlying conditions which give rise to them) should not be seen as separate from fighting international crime and terrorism, but rather as integral to it.

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and Islamist extremism. Hence, when the group gathered in St. Petersburg in early June 2002 to sign its official 26-point legal charter, Western diplomats called the SCO a "stillborn" organization, an ineffective young alliance made largely irrelevant by the insertion of US troops into the heart of Central Asia. They pointed out that the SCO could not marshal any military answer to the Afghan problem; furthermore, much to the alarm of Moscow and Beijing, its Central Asian members, particularly Uzbekistan, gladly welcomed US requests to station its military forces on their soil. See for example, Oliver August, "Stillborn Charter is Signed in Russia," The Times of London, June 8, 2002.

[56] Nicole Jackson, The Strategies and Tactics of International Institutions in Countering "Clandestine Transnational Activities" in Post-Soviet Central Asia: Why a Human Security Approach Is Needed Canadian Consortium on Human Security, August 2004.

[57] Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia, p.9.

Clandestine transnational activities are products of exceedingly complex issues which need to be addressed through many strategies. Although some positive efforts have been made to counter narcotic and human trafficking activities, the sources of these challenges and their consequences for the peoples of Central Asia have often been ignored. More specific knowledge is needed about each unique type of trafficking and their varying impacts on the peoples in the five different Central Asian states. More information also needs to be gathered about local perceptions of these activities. This will help in the development of targeted international strategies and tactics which may successfully work alongside local and regional initiatives.

Conclusions: Contributions and Critiques of the Copenhagen School's Securitisation Theory

Narcotic and Human Trafficking in Central Asia

This paper began by asking two sets of questions. First, why do international organizations securitize issues and why has the securitization of narcotic trafficking in Central Asia been comparatively more successful than human trafficking? Second, how has the process of securitisation of human and narcotic trafficking taken place, and has it lead to appropriate strategies to counter these activities?

The application of the Copenhagen's Schools' framework is helpful to understanding human and narcotic trafficking in Central Asia. Its application highlights that these are highly complicated activities in which it is difficult to untangle the "real" versus "perceived" or existential threats. It also shows that whose security is at risk is defined by securitising actors' security concepts. In other words, international organizations tend to invoke global security; the Central Asian states, state security; the migrants, human security etc.

This study concludes that the securitization of narcotic trafficking in Central Asia been comparatively more successful than human trafficking because there was more consensus about narcotic trafficking which was perceived as a comparatively serious and immediate issue. It was seen to threaten state and global security, and to be easier to attempt to counter than human trafficking. On the other hand, international organizations, the Central Asian states and societies, and the migrants themselves hold substantially different views and perceptions about human trafficking. They differ widely on whether or not it is a significant threat, and to whom. Therefore, unless Central Asian states adopt the human security concept, it is unlikely that they will ever put human trafficking high on their political agendas.

We found that the major actors (international, regional and domestic) were motivated to securitise both narcotic and human trafficking based on the similar broad factors not examined by the Copenhagen School: i.e. evolving norms; self-interest; changing geopolitics and understandings of "new threats"; reaction to terrorist events; and search for new institutional "raison d'être" or national identity.

However, there was generally more agreement among all the actors (international and domestic) about why narcotic trafficking should be securitized. In comparison, the issue of human trafficking was much more controversial. In both the cases, securitising actors had common broad understandings of evolving geopolitics and the new security environment, similar reactions to terrorist events (e.g. Sept 11), and were motivated by perceived financial benefits. In the case of human trafficking there were significant contestations between the motivations of international organizations and the Central Asian states. They had different underlying norms and beliefs, clashing issues of institutional "raison d'être" and national identity, and opposing fundamental interests. This also explains why international actors have had comparatively less success in securitizing human trafficking.

Finally, language was important in the process of securitization. It was used by the key securitizing actors to advance their agendas and gain political capital. However, in the case of human trafficking, it has not helped the marginalized (those trafficked) to advocate their interests. The paper also discovers other indicators of securitisation (not explored by the Copenhagen school) which include: the linkage of an issue with another previously recognized threat (in this case narcotic trafficking with terrorism); institutional and administrative changes; and resource allocation. Nevertheless, there remain many difficulties with trying to list the key indicators of the securitisation process. These exist largely because of the confusion over how to define "securitisation", contestation over whether it is a descriptive, theoretical or prescriptive framework, and the fact that it does not take into account security dichotomies.

The paper concludes by arguing that the influence of the rhetoric on the development of policy must be taken into account in the securitisation framework (which the Copenhagen School does not). Although international and domestic rhetoric about narcotic and, to a lesser extent about human trafficking has increased, this has not led to the most appropriate or effective actions. Instead it has led to the adoption of traditional security strategies, which although necessary, are not enough. Missing is empirical information, and an understanding that the real threats are the underlying conditions which give rise to these activities. A key problem here is alack of political will and capabilities and the need to deal with the political, economic social context within which criminal activities might be better understood, and dealt with. Also needed is more in depth examination of the complicity of states with criminal activity.

Copenhagen School's Securitisation Framework

As a theoretical and empirical tool, the presentation of the process of securitisation (i.e. through the speech-act) is too narrow. It does not take into account the wider context. It also does not account for all the other indicators of why securitisation occurs in the first place – evolving norms and beliefs, changing geopolitics and emergence of new threats; the development of sudden major/dramatic events; self-interest, the development of a security continuum and institutions' search for new goals or "raison d'être".

Second, in terms of developing a framework for future action, securitisation theory does not take into account gender or other factors (e.g. authoritarian state institutions or Islamic social context) which might suppress speech. Thus, according to the securitisation framework, the trafficking of women, and many other issues of concern to people in Central Asia, are unlikely to become security issues because for many segments of society speech is repressed. It is a state-centric framework which has little if any room for human security.

Also, as a policy-setting framework, there is an assumption that the process of securitisation will lead to positive outcomes. In reality, some issues are exaggerated while other "real" problems are dismissed. Careful empirical analyses needs to be done about real threats compared to perceptions of threats. Moreover, the act of securitisation itself may lead to strategies (e.g. traditional state security strategies) which do not adequately address the issues In fact, in theory, security maximization of transnational crime could lead to host countries being branded as rogue states liable to coercive international sanctions.

Finally, the study shows that, although powerful external actors can cause the securitisation of an issue in another state by defining it as a perceived threat, this may not be enough for securitisation to occur. A prerequisite for securitization to take place is for the domestic states themselves to be willing and able to securitise the issue. In turn, for this to happen, the introduction of new norms such as human security may be necessary. However, to effectively counter the real threats that face people today, including the underlying conditions that give rise to clandestine transnational activities, it is necessary to shift the focus to the existential security of individuals.

Appendix One: International and Regional Organizations' Securitisation of "New Threats" in Central Asia (OSCE, EU, IOM, UN, CIS, SCO)

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)

The OSCE is the largest regional organization in the world and includes fifty-five participating states from Europe, Central Asia and North America. The three main priorities upon which the OSCE was founded are: "to consolidate common values (human rights and fundamental freedoms) and to help build fully democratic civil societies based on rule of law; to prevent local conflicts, restore stability and bring peace to war-torn areas; and to overcome real and perceived security deficits and avoid creation of new divisions by promoting a co-operative system of security".[58] The organization was created based on the belief that states need to cooperate to prevent crises through a broad range of security measures including arms control, confidence and security-building issues, human rights, election monitoring, economic and environmental security. As a result, the OSCE's cooperative system of security was designed to focus on three "dimensions" of security: the "human dimension" (democracy and human rights), the "politico-military dimension"; and the "economic-environmental dimension".

In its early years, from 1992 to 1999, the OSCE concentrated most of its attention in Central Asia on the "human dimension" – largely to the neglect of the other policy dimensions. The five Central Asian states joined the then-CSCE as full members in January 1992. For most of the 1990s, Central Asia, geographically peripheral to Europe, was not a major area of focus for OSCE activities. Nevertheless, OSCE links were established in these states beginning in Uzbekistan in 1995, and there are currently OSCE Centres in all five states.[59] A major accomplishment of these centres was to conduct workshops on a variety of issues such as free elections, the responsibility of the media, human rights etc. However, despite the adoption of democratic rhetoric by some states, there have been few tangible results of their efforts as the democratic and human rights situations in all five states have made little progress and, in many cases, worsened.

Since the late 1990s, in contrast, the OSCE's major focus has been on what it terms "new security threats" and in particular clandestine transnational activities. This is the case largely because of the three reasons following reasons: First, the OSCE began to shift its policies when its early democratic and human rights goals became widely perceived as failures; second, the OSCE responded to an evolving geopolitical context which led to supposedly "new" transnational activities being widely perceived as "threats" by the international community; and third, the OSCE reacted to major terrorist events in Central Asia and the U.S. which resulted in terrorism being placed at the front of the OSCE's (and other institutions') agenda. Largely as a result of these three factors, the OSCE

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[58] The OSCE's mandate is to serve as "the primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management, and post-conflict rehabilitation".

[59] OSCE Centres opened in 1999 in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. The original Liaison office in Tashkent was turned into a Centre in 2000. An OSCE field office has operated in Tajikistan since 94 and an OSCE Centre opened there in 2002.

began to redefine its goals and search for a new or reconceptualized "raison d'être" which would shape its role in the international community. The details of this process will be explored in section three which examines more carefully the motivations for multilateral organizations to securitise these issues.

As a result, by the end of the 1990s, the OSCE became increasingly concerned with "new threats", and its articulated interest in (and rhetoric about) Central Asia also greatly increased. In 2002, Jozias von Aartsen, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, affirmed that the OSCE would continue in earnest to develop its comprehensive approach to security issues in Central Asia.[60] In 2003, Central Asia was declared the OSCE's core regional priority.[61] This priority continues under the current 2004 Bulgarian chairmanship.

The United Nations and the UNODC

The United Nations had similar reasons to attempt by the end of the 1990s to securitise narcotic and human trafficking. In particular, the UN was influence by the changing geopolitical context (including the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the resulting porous borders between states); the advent of "global terrorism", and the perceived (or assumed) connections between terrorism and illicit trafficking. As a result, UN rhetoric and policy statements evolved towards focusing increasingly on the issues of narcotic and human trafficking in Central Asia.

Compared to the OSCE, United Nations' principles are equally wide-ranging and include the promotion of human security and conflict prevention. The UN's first major role in Central Asia was very specific - to help broker a settlement of the Tajik conflict. Then, after the settlement in 1997, the focus of many UN agencies turned toward other conflict prevention and human security projects based on the UN belief that it is necessary to address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional etc. causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflict. The UNDP, as just one example of a UN agency, has instituted programs in Central Asia aimed at providing access to basic resources and services e.g. health, education, employment and land as well as pursuing poverty reduction, human rights protection etc.[62]

However, again by the end of the 1990s, UN focus shifted to include more programs aimed at countering transnational crime (narcotic, arms and human trafficking) along with terrorism. As an overall framework for action, the UN outlined a series of conventions and protocols dealing with transnational crimes, corruption and terrorism both in general and specifically in Central Asia. In specific, the UN Office on Drugs and

[60] The Netherlands assumed chairmanship of the OSCE in 2003.
[61] "Central Asia at centre stage: the challenges of co-operation", OSCE Newsletter, April 2003, pp.1-3.
[62] Jacob Simonsen, Deputy Regional Director, UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe and the CIS, "Addressing Root Causes: Improving Social and Economic Prospects", Summary Report: Bishkek International Conference on Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia: Strengthening Comprehensive Efforts to Counter Terrorism, December 2001, pp.119-121, p.119.

Crime (UNODC), the principal international agency supporting efforts to combat drug trafficking, organized crime and international terrorism, has greatly increased its activities in Central Asia since the late 1990s.

The UNODC's mandate is to work with member states to strengthen the rule of law, promote stable and viable criminal systems and combat the growing threat of transnational organized crime through better cooperation.[63] UNODC projects multiplied with a heightened perception that crime was increasing and that narcotic, arms and human trafficking in particular were increasing, especially across the Central Asian states' borders with Afghanistan. Also, the US-led "war on terrorism" helped to forge an international consensus that action must be taken to combat a series of interlinked threats including terrorism and trafficking. As a result, UNODC priorities came to pay "special attention to combating transnational organized crime, corruption and illicit trafficking in human beings" and the organization now perceives Central Asia as a priority region.[64]

The European Union

EU motivations to securitise narcotic and human trafficking were only slightly different than that of the OSCE and UN. The EU showed its first interest in Central Asia much later – it began to develop a framework for its policy towards Central Asia only in 1999. As the EU began to expand to the East, the organization became increasingly interested in developing closer relations with its "new neighbours". However, even then, Central Asia was not, and still is not, a priority for the EU as are, for example, the other European CIS states such as Russia and Ukraine.

However, in 2001 EU interest in Central Asia greatly increased. The key event for the EU in this regard was the beginning of the US-led war on global terrorism. Consequently, in December 2001, the EU Council issued a statement that it "attaches a great importance to tackling the root causes of terrorism and conflict in the region [Central Asia] by supporting efforts to improve governance and to reduce poverty". In the same statement the Council outlined that its main interest in countering a range of transnational security threats is because they "have become highly relevant in view of the conflict in Afghanistan".[65]As a result, EU policies in the region have been specifically based on the understanding that trafficking (and in particular narcotic trafficking) in Central Asia is directly affecting EU states and its citizens; and that all kinds of trafficking are, or may be, linked to terrorism.

Largely as a result of this new thinking, the EU's Central Asian Regional Strategy Paper, 2002-2006 states that the core objective of EU policy towards the region is "to promote the stability and security of the countries of Central Asia and to assist in their pursuit of

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[63] The UNODC is composed of a number of branches including a UN Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB), the International Drug Control Program (UNDCP) and the Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP).

[64] See, www.unodc.org/

[65] Conclusions of the General Affairs Council on Central Asia, document 15078/01, 10 December, 2001.

sustainable economic development and poverty reduction".[66] Largely because "new threats" are seen as transnational in character, EU strategy now calls for a regional approach to the former Soviet states, rather than its previous bilateral approach as the most appropriate way to deal with the region. The EU made the decision to enhance political dialogue with all countries of Central Asia, to combat drug trafficking coming from the region, and to consider action on border control and border management, including arms smuggling and non-proliferation.

The International Organization on Migration (IOM)

The International Organization on Migration (IOM) is a very different institution than the others examine above. In particular it is unique because it deals with only one issue – migration. Since the early 1990s, the IOM has been the lead agency in dealing with human trafficking in Central Asia.[67] Its attempts to securitise this issue thus comes as little surprise as it is in line with its mandate to assist in the operational challenges of migration management, to advance understanding of migration issues, encourage social and economic development through migration, and to uphold the human dignity and well-being of migrants.

However, similar to the other international organizations, the IOM also reacted in response to newly perceived threats and to geopolitical changes. As a result, the IOM has developed programs to directly help people in the region from being exploited by criminal gangs and it works alongside local groups. The IOM has been active in raising awareness and developing working strategies with the Central Asian governments on a range of trafficking issues as well as working directly with migrants, and victims of trafficking. The extent of IOM involvement in the region has greatly increased since the end of the 90s and it is increasingly focus on border control, immigration inspection and human trafficking. This seems to be largely because of the increased concern over these issues articulated by the wider international community and the willingness of donors to fund projects which deal with these issues.

Eurasian Regional Organizations: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

The SCO, as a new organization, has been searching to define a role for itself in the region; and the CIS, a largely defunct organization, has tried to resurrect cooperation among its members. Both organizations have attempted to accomplish this by highlighting common transnational security challenges. In particular, they have used/exploited their member states' concerns about terrorism and rhetorically linked terrorism with trafficking and illegal migration as grave security concerns.

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[66] Strategy Paper 2002-2006 and Indicative Programme 2002-2004 for Central Asia.

[67] The IOM opened offices in Dushanbe (92) Bishkek (96), Ashgabat (97), Almaty (98). Tajikistan joined the IOM in 1994, Kyrgyz Republic in 2000, Kazakhstan in 2002.

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) includes Russia, China and the Central Asian states (minus Turkmenistan). The SCO arose in 2001 out of the Shanghai Five, a loose security group which began in 1996[68] which had been created as a means to discuss broad proposals for Central Asian security and to coordinate on demilitarization of border regions and other military confidence building measures. [69]

However, beginning with the 1999 summit in Bishkek, the SCO's mandate began to change and to increasingly emphasize transnational security issues and in particular it now stressed the development of collective efforts to counter religious and separatist extremism and narcotic trafficking. In June 2001, even before the events of September 11, 2001, the SCO members signed the "Shanghai Covenant on the Suppression of Terrorism, Separatism and (Religious) Extremism". That year the SCO's agenda was officially broadened and Uzbekistan joined the organization. The organization's main security goal became to combat the "three evil forces" of terrorism, extremism, and separatism" as well as narcotic trafficking.[70] In 2002, the six presidents of the SCO member states signed the Charter of the SCO and agreed to create an anti-terrorism agency in the region.

Similarly, in the 1990s the Russian-dominated CIS produced a lot of rhetoric, some new institutions, but mostly empty agreements and little action about security issues in Central Asia. This is largely because Russia has, in the past, been generally focusing on building bilateral relations with each of the Central Asia states rather than on developing multilateral CIS agreements, and also because of the suspicion among the Central Asia states over Russia's intentions. However, similar to the SCO, soon after the events of September 11th 2001 and largely in reaction to the development of US bases in Central Asia, Russia has made renewed attempts to recreate a CIS collective security system in the region. And Russia currently hopes to turn the old CIS Collective Security Council into an active regional security organization which will deal with transnational security issues including trafficking and terrorism. Thus in April 2003, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (as well as Armenia, and Belarus) formally created the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).[71] The CSTO was created to address "new threats" and challenges through a joint military command in Moscow, a rapid

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[68] This Shanghai Five was comprised of every current SCO member except Uzbekistan

[69] The SCO was founded on basic principles which include adherence to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; respect for each other's independence, equality among all member states; and settlement of all questions through consultations. According to the SCO Charter and the Declaration on the Establishment of the SCO, the SCO has a very wide range of purposes including strengthening mutual trust and good-neighbourliness and friendship among member states; developing effective cooperation in political affairs, economy, trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection and other fields; working together to maintain regional peace, security and stability; and promoting the creation of a new international political and economic order featuring democracy, justice and rationality.

[70] "St. Petersburg Summit of SCO Concludes with Rich Fruit," Xinhua News Agency, June 7, 2002.

[71] The CSTO is based on the 1992 CIS Collective Security Treaty which sought to promote greater strategic cooperation among the signatories.

reaction force for Central Asia, and a common air defence system.[72] The CSTO is to concentrate on combating both terrorism and narcotic trafficking in Central Asia, with a rapid deployment force to be stationed at the Russian air force base in Kyrgyzstan.[73]

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[72] The organization has now committed to creating permanent institutions responsible for budget management and strategic military planning.

[73] According to the Russian military, this base will give air support to the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces in case of military action. The Times of Central Asia, October 23, 2003, p.1.